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Existing research on the determinants of international trade tends to examine the impact
of aggregate joint IGO memberships, and has done little to separate IGOs into various
function types. Using a new IGO dataset and a novel network analysis approach called
the temporal exponential random graph model (TERGM), I assess the importance of
three main IGO types – economic, social and general purpose – in helping states to
establish major trading relations. The results provide support for the importance of
general purpose IGOs in forging strong bilateral trade, and also draw attention to en-
dogenous network structures such as popularity and triadic closure effects. A robustness
test further reveals that PTAs and other economic IGOs such as regional banks are also
instrumental in fostering major trading relations. This thesis presents a more nuanced
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Introduction
Much research on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has examined the rela-
tionship between joint IGO memberships and peace.1 Comparatively less research has
been done in looking at how the complex web of joint IGO memberships affect bilateral
trade.2 Even less research has been done in examining how specific types of IGOs,
both economic and non-economic, affect trade (Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005)).
This paper primarily seeks to examine the importance of three main IGO types – eco-
nomic, social and general purpose – in helping states to establish major trading partner
relations3 , taking into account interdependencies and endogenous effects in the world
trade network.4 I assert that common memberships in either economic, socio-cultural
or general purpose IGOs have a significant positive impact on establishing strong bilat-
eral trade. Moreover, I argue that endogenous network effects are both substantively
and empirically significant in international trade. Importantly, this paper makes three
major contributions to the international political economy literature by: (1) providing
an interdisciplinary and more nuanced theoretical discussion of how different types of
IGOs play a part in establishing strong bilateral trade, drawing from political science,
sociology and economics; (2) moving away from traditional dyadic analysis to concep-
tualizing and examining the world trade network as a whole, and (3) applying a new
network analysis method developed by Hanneke, Fu and Xing (2010), called the Tempo-
ral Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM), that takes into account endogenous
structural effects and interdependencies in the world trade network.
1 See Russett and Oneal (2001), Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004), Ward, Siverson and Cao
(2007), and Dorussen and Ward (2008).
2 See Ward and Hoff (2008) and Zhou (2010).
3 The emphasis is on strong and meaningful trading ties. Focussing on major trading partners will
also allow me to thin the international trade network more (otherwise it will be almost completely
connected, which does not yield very meaningful analysis), as well as to conduct a more conservative
test on the effects of IGOs on bilateral trade. More will be explained in section V (under thresholding
of the dependent variable) of this paper.
4 I will also examine how the internal organization of IGOs affects bilateral trade, but that is not the
primary aim of my paper.
In the areas of international political economy, researchers often focus only on eco-
nomic IGOs and investigate how they matter in establishing bilateral trade.5 More
notably, existing scholars emphasize specific economic IGOs such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO). However, evidence are often mixed. For instance, Subramanian
and Wei (2007) argue that GATT/WTO memberships are effective in bringing down
trade barriers between countries and thus help to increase bilateral trade between mem-
bers. Moreover, Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007) argue that the WTO/GATT not
only promotes trade among its signatories, but also has a broad positive spillover effect
on trade that extends beyond its membership. On other hand, Rose (2004) argues that
the WTO has little or no effect on bilateral trade, noting that “bilateral trade cannot be
strongly or dependably linked to membership in the WTO or its predecessor the GATT”
(p.112). Consequently, researchers do not have clear theory and evidence as to whether
economic IGOs such as the WTO promote trade.6
Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) argue that “the mixed record is the result of a
failure to account fully for the social structural implications of IGOs” (p.826). To elabo-
rate, the complex IGO network that states are embedded in help to influence and shape
trade relations among states not only through economic means via economic IGOs, but
also through socialization, common identity creation and information diffusion through
socio-cultural IGOs. As Uzzi (1996) and Granovetter (1985) have pointed out, the range
of informal and formal connections between actors help to smooth exchanges between
them. Thus, while the agenda of social IGOs such as UNESCO are non-economic in
nature as they aim to promote peace and intercultural dialogues among countries, social
IGOs create a sense of shared empathy and help to strengthen cultural affinity among
members. This in turn may lead to greater trust and credible commitments among
members that help to spur trade. Moreover, current literature such as Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2009), Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer (2005) and Rauch and Trindade
(2002), all point to the importance of culture and social networks in trade. The authors
note that cultural affinity is one of the significant components for strong bilateral trade.
5 Non-economic IGOs are often disregarded in explaining bilateral trade between countries. The link
between non-economic IGOs and bilateral trade seems to be indirect, tenuous, and not very well-theorized
in general (see Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005)).
6 As a note, the effects of other types of economic IGOs such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
are also mixed and uneven (see Eicher and Henn (2011)). This paper will separate and test the effects
of different types of economic IGOs for greater robustness.
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Apart from social IGOs, general-purpose IGOs might also help to facilitate exchanges
among countries. General purpose IGOs are umbrella organizations that help to fa-
cilitate a wide-range of political, social and economic activities. In a sense, general
purpose IGOs can also be conceived as hybrid organizations that perform functions of
both socio-cultural and economic IGOs. For instance, the Nordic Council helps to not
only encourage cross-border communications among its members through educational
exchanges and scientific research, but also aims to weave comparatively advantaged
industries such as Infocomm Technologies in the Nordic region together for scientific
and economic growth.7 Indeed, general-purpose IGOs serve as multi-functional and
flexible organizations that provide ample opportunities for information sharing and re-
peated interactions through diverse issue areas, thereby increasing familiarity of member
states and making it easier for reputation costs to be incurred if a state reneges on an
agreement. Compliance with international agreements might thus be enhanced through
general purpose IGOs.
In addition, IGOs can also be classified according to their internal organization. As
such, researchers should also look at how the internal structure of IGOs affects trade.
Intuitively, we would think that highly institutionalized IGOs with dispute settlement
mechanisms, such as the WTO, would be more important for major trading relations
than minimally organized IGOs without an extensive bureaucracy, such as the Associ-
ation of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC). To note, the different structural IGO types
are - Lastly, moving away from strictly dyadic analysis and conceptualizing the world
trade network as a massive complex system with a large number of actors8 and intri-
cate trading relations, I also test for the endogenous structural effects (popularity and
triangles)9 after accounting for the covariates and control variables in my models. None
of the current literature investigating the impact of IGOs on the world trade network
accounts for endogenous network effects. Following Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), I
use the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM) in my analysis. Indeed,
examining the world trade network as a whole provides a more accurate analysis in my
7 See Nordic Council website: http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/areas-of-co-
operation/information-technology
8 I have only looked at states and IGOs in this paper, but in reality, the world trade network is much
more complex and comprises of other actors such as firms, NGOs and private individuals.
9 More will be explained later.
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paper and might address some of the inconsistent results in traditional dyadic research.
Consequently, this paper advances traditional research in that it not only unpacks
the IGO predictor into more nuanced functional and structural types, but also views the
world trade web as a massive network of economic, socio-cultural and political interde-
pendencies.10 In my analysis, I find that only general-purpose IGOs are significant in
encouraging major trading ties, out of the three main IGO functional types. The re-
sult points to the explanation that general purpose IGOs provide multiple, flexible and
repeated opportunities for interactions to occur across political, economic and social
issues, resulting in greater reputation costs if a state reneges on an agreement, as well as
more holistic information exchanges that are critical to forming strong trade relations.
In addition, within economic IGOs only PTAs are impactful, while the WTO and other
economic IGOs such as regional banks are not. There is also inconclusive evidence while
looking at structured versus minimal IGOs. Nonetheless, my empirical evidence suggests
that endogenous network effects are positive and significant across all my models. This
paper serves a a first step in examining the endogenous structural effects of the world
trade network.
This paper is organized as follows: section II provides an overview of IGOs and
discusses the theoretical importance of economic, social, and general purpose IGOs with
respect to bilateral trade. Section III examines and compares the impact of structured
versus minimal IGOs. Section IV reconceptualizes world trade as one massive network
of complex trading relations and introduces a network (TERGM) approach of analyzing
bilateral trade. Section V provides an overview of the data and variables used in my
models and section VI discusses the results. Lastly, I conclude the paper with some
recommendations for future research.
Definition and a Brief Background of IGOs
Pevehouse, Nordstrom and Warnke (2004) operationally defined an IGO as (1) con-
sisting of at least three members of the Correlates of War (COW) state system, (2) an
10 Note that this paper mainly extends the debate by Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) and focuses
on socio-cultural, general purpose and economic IGOs. Another set of IGOs, which are political/security-
related, are not emphasized. I have used military alliances as a control variable instead. Military alliances
are equivalent to security-related IGOs.
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organization that holds regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, and (3) an
organization that possesses a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters.11
Examples of prominent IGOs include the European Union (EU), the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Several other smaller
IGOs (both in membership and in function) exist. Till date, almost five hundred IGOs
have been present in the international system.12
According to the COW IGO data, the oldest extant IGO is the Central Commission
for the Navigation of the Rhine, which was formed in 1815 “in response to the economic
interdependence of states along one of Europes most important rivers” (Russett and
Oneal (2001), p.160). Since 1815, IGOs have been increasingly ubiquitous in the world.
Furthermore, as Russet and Oneal (2001) note, the phenomenon of IGOs is primarily a
twentieth-century one: the growth of IGOs has been particularly great since the end of
World War II (ibid).
From their inception, IGOs are created to deal with economic, political and socio-
cultural problems in world politics. While some IGOs such as the European Space
Agency exist to handle specific issues, others such as the United Nations and the Nordic
Council are umbrella organizations that provide a multilateral platform for a myriad
of issues to be discussed. Moreover, both specialized and general purpose IGOs might
work together to pool information and expedite international agreements. In this paper,
three main types of IGOs are discussed: (1) economic, (2) socio-cultural, and (3) general
purpose.
Figure 1a shows the respective proportions of IGOs grouped by function. From
Figure 1a, there are 202 economic IGOs, 167 socio-cultural IGOs, and 96 general purpose
IGOs in the international system.13 Thus, economic IGOs form the largest proportion
of IGOs compared to socio-cultural and general purpose ones. However, this is not to
say that other types of IGOs are unimportant as they still constitute a considerable
11 Note that the authors criteria of an IGO are modified from those provided by Wallace and Singer
(1970).
12 I have taken into account only those IGOs that are coded in the COW data.
13 Note that another 30 IGOs belong to political/security IGOs but these IGOs are not emphasized
in this paper. The reasons are noted in an earlier footnote (see footnote 7). Also, while the COW IGO
data may not be perfectly comprehensive, it is the best quantitative IGO data that scholars have at
present.
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number of IGOs in the world.
Many notable large-n studies in international trade use aggregate joint IGO mem-
bership as a variable of interest.14 Few studies break down total joint IGO membership
into its constituents and analyze their respective individual effects.15 Consequently,
as Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) note, economic IGOs such as the WTO and
the IMF are being treated equivalently to socio-cultural organizations such as UNESCO
and the World Health Organization when researchers analyze the effects of IGOs on
bilateral trade. For a more accurate investigation, it is necessary to differentiate IGOs
into different types. Indeed, researchers who don’t differentiate the types of IGOs risk
overwhelming his/her results with the effects of economic IGOs since these IGOs con-
stitute the largest proportion of all IGOs in the world. Moreover, different types of
IGOs constitute sub IGO networks that can impact trade in theoretically interesting
and different ways. The next few sections will tease out the substantive importance of
each of the IGO types and attempt to establish the causal link between each particular
type of IGO and bilateral trade.
Differentiating IGOs by Function Type
Economic IGOs
Economic IGOs as a whole facilitate the diffusion of information. For instance,
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is active in disseminating ideas and
policies of economic liberalization among its members. In addition, APEC and other
economic IGOs such as the OECD frequently release economic reports and data of
member states to decrease uncertainty and facilitate trade. These economic reports
may contain important findings of meetings, as well as particular responses of countries
dealing with commodity or international financial crises. Indeed, economic IGOs help
to spread information, ideas and policies to connecting states. Consequently, being
14 See Ward and Hoff (2008), Ward, Ahlquist and Rozenas (2013), and Zhou (2010).
15 Notably, four recent research that differentiate IGOs are: Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004),
Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005), Bearce and Bondanella (2007) and Xun (2009). Other studies such
as Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007), and Eicher and Henn (2011) have analyzed very specific
IGOs such as the WTO or PTAs, but do not incorporate other types of economic, socio-cultural or
general-purpose IGOs into their papers.
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a member in an economic IGO will increase its economic transparency and visibility
to other members. Moreover, as information uncertainty often shrouds healthy trade
relations among countries, economic IGOs thus help to reduce uncertainty and promote
trade in the international system.
Economic IGOs also promote standardization and harmonization among members
in the respective organizations. Moreover, some economic IGOs such as the WTO,
Mercosur and the OECD directly affect trade among member states. For instance, the
WTO sets out the rights and obligations of trade based on the core principles of market
liberalism and non-discrimination. Other economic IGOs such as the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) also facilitate trade among its members through standardized trade
regulatory frameworks and policies. Infrastructure projects spearheaded by the ADB
in various developing member states will also help facilitate trade indirectly through
lowering transaction costs. In addition, economic IGOs also help to protect property
rights and facilitate international transactions. As Souva and Rowan (2008) point out,
market-protecting institutions have the most positive, direct and significant impact on
trade compared to security and democratic institutions. The authors posit that the
most important institutions affecting transaction costs are not security or democratic
institutions, but institutions that protect private property, establish banking and in-
surance laws, and create common standards of measurement. Indeed, economic IGOs
promote a safe environment for trade to occur via the protection of private property as
well as lower transaction costs by establishing common standards, rules and regulations.
Notably, countries that aspire to become major trading partners with one another need
to leverage the functions of economic IGOs to forge strong trading relationships.
As with all other types of negotiations in international relations, trade talks are
often mired with problems of credible commitment. Due to the anarchical nature of
the international system, countries have no world government to turn to if the other
party reneges on a trade agreement. Indeed, credible commitment problems are critical
non-tariff barriers to international trade. IGOs provide countries with a platform to
solve problems that they are unable to solve independently thus realizing the benefits of
mutual cooperation. For instance, the WTO provides for a dispute settlement mecha-
nism to adjudicate trade disputes, thus reducing tensions and increasing the possibility
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of cooperation among member states. Russett and Oneal (2001) assert that the legal16
and adjudicating role of IGOs are significant because “they reduce the cost of enforcing
contracts, encourage their creation, and promote exchange” (p.163; also see Stone Sweet
and Brunell (1998)). The mediation role of some IGOs thus provides member states with
an additional avenue for conflict resolution under anarchy in the international system.
Moreover, by ameliorating tensions between member states, IGOs help to maintain and
sustain ties in the network.
Furthermore, even for economic IGOs that do not have the power to adjudicate
disputes, member states often engage in repeated interaction17 , thereby widening the
shadow of the future and allowing credible commitments to be made (Abbott and Snidal
(2000), and Keohane (1984)). In addition, as quasi-supranational entities, IGOs also act
as whistleblowers that identify states that do not comply with agreements. As a result,
states that renege on international agreements are likely to suffer reputation costs that
might thwart their future attempts for cooperation with other states to reap joint gains.
Thus, through communication, arbitration, repeated interactions and scrutiny, member
states in economic IGOs are able to escape the Prisoner’s Dilemma predicament that is
typical of international politics.
Social IGOs
Formed explicitly for socio-cultural purposes, social IGOs help to forge common
understanding in a variety of areas and further strengthen the relations of member states.
Uncertainties and tensions among members might thus be reduced. Importantly, socio-
cultural IGOs help form the social glue that is required for more lasting and stronger
trade ties among countries, paving way for major trading relations to occur. For instance,
social IGOs such as UNESCO aim to promote intercultural dialogues and exchanges
among its members, thus reducing cultural barriers and enhancing communication flows
among member states. Moreover, as Granovetter (1985) notes, trust, empathy and
sympathy may arise from relationships, that are ultimately important for exchange.
Indeed, bilateral trade between countries occur not only in the economic realm, but
16 As per international law.
17 These economic IGOs can range from the WTO to PTAs to financial IGOs.
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is also based on the larger social context of trading partners. The social network that
countries are based in help to regulate economic activities between them. In other words,
countries that can easily identify with each other through a shared sense of community,
values and social norms might better engage in bilateral trade. In addition, Reigrotski
and Anderson (1959) note that social contacts between citizens of two countries help
to promote positive stereotypes and reduce aversion. In sum, Ingram, Robinson and
Busch (2005) posit two arguments that illustrate the causal explanation of how social
IGOs affect trade: (1) social IGOs “increase awareness, sympathy, empathy and even
trust between the citizens of different countries”, leading to (2) a shift in cross-national
relations and perceptions that results in more trade (p.830). In their study, Ingram,
Robinson and Busch (2005) also found evidence that socio-cultural IGOs are significant
in encouraging bilateral trade flows, providing evidence for the authors’ assertion on the
importance of socio-cultural IGOs in trade.
To elaborate further, social IGOs are multilateral platforms designed to create a
sense of joint purpose and might further increase affinity among members. Moreover,
social IGOs often advocate a joint purpose that is is targeted at certain existing social
norms such as human or environmental rights. For instance, the Valdivia Group, com-
prising of six member states18 from three distinct cultural regions around the world,
has the shared purpose of promoting environmental and social justice through innova-
tive biodiversity and climate change programs.19 In this case, a member state might
also be more willing to engage in trade with another member since that member is also
likely to safeguard certain environmental rights. In addition, social IGOs act as a com-
mon platform to help states to identify other similar states in the international system.
Trade relations can thus be further established. Moreover, as Ingram, Robinson and
Busch (2005) asserts, “there is plentiful evidence from social psychology that groupings
produce affinity to group members, the ubiquitous in-group/out-group effect” (ibid). A
further test by Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) reveals that social IGOs were a more
positive influence compared to economic IGOs on bilateral affinity, a measure created
by Gartzke (2000) that depicts the rank order correlation of states’ voting in the United
Nations General Assembly. Bilateral affinity might thus manifest into mutual trust,
18 The six states are: Australia, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa and Uruguay.
19 For more information, see http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1996/fa2bgrnd.html
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which has important implications on bilateral trade. In their study, Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2009) note that “lower bilateral trust leads to less trade between two
countries, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment, even after controlling for
the characteristics of the two countries” (p.1095). Countries that trust each other more
might thus be more willing and confident of engaging in bilateral trade.
Helping to forge a sense of community and shared purpose, social IGOs decrease
the cultural distance among member states. This entails greater familiarity among
members which in turn might raise the repetutation costs of reneging agreements in
bilateral trade. In addition, a country that reneges on a trade agreement might signal to
another country in the same social IGO that it might also be unreliable in noneconomic
or social agreements. In this way, membership social IGOs might help to enhance the
accountability of states in international agreements.
Importantly, bilateral trade between countries also comprise of “cultural goods”
such as foreign films, artwork, newspapers, books, and apparel to name a few. For
instance, member states of the Nordic Children’s Film Council might increase bilateral
trade in films and theatre-related books through specific programs of the IGO. As such,
countries in the same social IGO might enjoy greater bilateral trade in these goods
when cross-cultural communication and exchanges are enhanced. Other examples may
include the Valdivia Group and the Commonwealth Science Council, in which members
increase cooperation and trade in scientific advancements such as biotechnology and
water-treatment technologies following membership. Consequently, social IGO might
directly affect bilateral trade among member states.
In addition, while there might be a possibility of selection effects, that is, countries
join these social IGOs because of cultural affinity in the first place, social IGOs might
also cause trade in cultural goods following membership due to specific programs within
these IGOs. In addition, as emphasized above, social IGOs may further enhance affinity
among countries that share the same ideals. Thus, the multi-faceted nature of social




General purpose IGOs are umbrella organizations that focus on communication be-
tween and the administration of governments. General IGOs such as the United Nations
(UN), Nordic Council, African Civil Service Observatory and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) perform multiple functions of standardizing, harmonizing,
monitoring, and administrating agreements among their members (Ingram, Robinson
and Busch (2005)). Furthermore, diplomatic negotiations often include politics and se-
curity affairs such as counter-terrorism measures, anti-piracy collaboration to ensure
maritime security, as well as measures to protect the environment. Together, these help
to create about a more conducive and stable political and economic environment for
strong trading relations to occur.
Multi-functional and inter-disciplinary in nature, general purpose IGOs can thus be
conceived as hybrid organizations that perform functions of economic and socio-cultural
IGOs. For instance, the Nordic Council helps to not only encourage cultural communica-
tions among its members through educational exchanges and scientific research, but also
links up comparatively advantaged industries in the Nordic region, such as Infocomm
Technologies, together for scientific and economic growth. Moreover, like many other
general purpose IGOs, the Nordic Council also seeks to connect its members to other
countries such as the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Russia for
stronger cultural and economic exchanges in the Baltic sea region.20 Indeed, general-
purpose IGOs serve as multi-functional organizations that will have a significant impact
on trade among member states. Consequently, general purpose IGOs are an important
set of organizations that not only enhance bilateral social ties but also bilateral trade,
resulting in robust trade partnerships.
In some cases, general purpose IGOs can also directly influence trade policies and
bilateral trade among members. For instance, ASEAN members have established an
ASEAN Free trade Area (AFTA) since 1992, which aims to reduce tariff rates on a
wide range of products traded among members.21 Known as the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Agreement, tariff rates on a diversity of goods are reduced
20 See Nordic Council website: http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/international-co-operation
21 Note that the AFTA is a policy of ASEAN and is not coded as an economic IGO in the dataset.
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to 0-5%.22 Other non-tariff barriers are also reduced or eliminated. Indeed, one of
the important aims of AFTA is to encourage long-term economic competitiveness of its
members through trade liberalization, as well as provide a greater diversity of goods
and services for consumers within the region. Notably, ASEAN members are also main
trading partners with one another, reflecting the significance of the organization.23
States that have multiple joint memberships in general IGOs may thus establish
more linkages across a variety of issue areas, which may result in greater diplomatic and
economic interdependence. Due to its diverse functions, general IGOs provide a greater
chance for repeated interactions and information sharing compared to both social and
economic IGOs, which are more specific in their scope. As a result, repeated interactions
across various political, economic and social issues may further increase familiarity and
also reputation costs from reneging on promises. Credible commitments and compliance
to international agreements may thus be enhanced through joint memberships in general
IGOs.
Consequently, through interactions across diverse issues, members in general IGOs
provide a more holistic picture of themselves and their credibility in various international
agreements. General IGOs thus provide transparency and opportunities for members
to access each other more accurately in individual issue areas and as a whole. Indeed,
general IGOs provide a flexible platform for members to interact with each other. As
such, general IGOs are important because they are broad in scope and are flexible, giving
opportunities for a diverse network of ties to be established. In a sense, the discussion
on general IGOs also reflect the importance of political and socio-cultural linkages in
trade relations. Indeed, trade is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that is also
dependent on political and socio-cultural activities. With the theoretical discussion
developed so far, I form the following hypotheses:
Hypotheses 1a-c: H1(a)-(c): As joint membership in either (a) economic, (b)
social, or (c) general purpose IGOs between two countries increases, the countries are
more likely to establish major trading ties.
22 See ASEAN AFTA website: http://www.aseansec.org/12021.htm
23 Of course, other factors such as direct contiguity, culture, memberships in other types of IGOs are
also at play. The relevant variables will be discussed, analyzed and tested in this paper.
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The Internal Organization of IGOs
Thus far, we have only differentiated IGOs according to the primary functions they
serve. However, IGOs can also be classified according to their institutional capacity
or internal organization. Wallace and Singer (1970) first highlighted the issue that
IGOs are heterogenous in their institutional capacity. Since then not much research has
been made to distinguish IGOs from their internal organization.24 Boehmer, Gartzke
and Nordstrom (2004) note that treating IGOs homogeneously when they are in fact
heterogenous distorts and obscures the impact of more powerful or structured IGOs on
state foreign policies. Indeed, some IGOs might be more effective in facilitating and
organizing bilateral trade than others due to their internal organization. As Ingram,
Robinson and Busch (2005) note, “even casual observers of international organizations
realize that IGOs vary in their capacities to affect their members and achieve their
goals, and that it would be a mistake to ignore the distinction between minimalist
organizations (such as the International Wool Study Group) and more powerful ones (like
the WTO)” (p.832). To add, we would think that highly institutionalized IGOs with
dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the WTO, would be more important for major
trading partners than minimally organized IGOs without an extensive bureaucracy, such
as the Association of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC) or the International Wool Study
Group.
Following Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005), this paper will test the effects of
two types of IGOs based on their internal structure: (1) minimal and (2) structured
IGOs.25 To operationalize, minimal IGOs are are those IGOs that contain plenary
meetings, committees, and possibly a secretariat without an extensive bureaucracy be-
yond research, planning, and information gathering (see also definitions by Boehmer,
Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004)). On the other hand, structured organizations contain
structures of assembly, executive (nonceremonial), and/or bureaucracy to implement
policy, as well as formal procedures and rules. In addition, structured IGOs may also
contain mechanisms for mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and/or other means to
24 For a more thorough elaboration, see Volgy, Elizabeth Fausett and Rodgers (2008).
25 Since I am using the coding scheme supplied by Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005), it makes sense
to follow their classification in my paper.
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enforce organizational decisions and norms.
To elaborate, minimal IGOs have little or no institutional capacity to coerce mem-
ber states. The only way for minimal IGOs to shape states’ behavior is through “soft”
methods such as norm and identity creation, as well as facilitating information and
communication flows. Structured IGOs on the other hand are likely to use both so-
cialization and coercion. In some cases, structured IGOs can also use their mediation
mechanisms to further shape the preferences of states and impact their behavior. As
a result, structured IGOs are likely to provide greater stability and certainty of trade
outcomes, and are thus viewed as a much better alternative to minimal IGOs. Figure 1b
shows the respective proportions of IGOs grouped by institutional type: minimal IGOs
greatly outnumber structured ones (303 versus 192). Importantly, it also makes sense
to empirically differentiate between structured and minimal IGOs, otherwise the effect
of minimal IGOs is likely to eclipse that of structured IGOs leading to bias results. I
expect the following:
Hypothesis 2: Joint membership through structured IGOs has a greater positive
effect on bilateral trade than does joint membership through minimal IGOs.
Reconceptualizing International Trade
Before delving into the empirical analysis to test for the effects of the different types
of IGOs, we first need to have an accurate and holistic conceptualization of the inter-
national trade system so as to explain our dependent variable more meaningfully. As
we investigate the effects of IGOs on bilateral trade between countries, we need to be
cognizant of the intricate interdependencies inherent in the international trade network.
As Ward, Ahlquist and Rozenas (2013) remarked, “Bilateral transactions are necessar-
ily embedded in a larger web of trade”. For instance, bilateral trade between Sweden
and Denmark is unlikely to be independent of say, trade between Sweden and Norway.
Scholars should thus study bilateral trade in the larger framework of the world trade
network, accounting for complex interdependent relations.
In addition, it is also substantively salient to investigate how the structure of the
world trade network itself affects bilateral trade between countries. In other words,
we need to take into account the endogenous effects of international trade, not just
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exogenous factors. Drawing from network science and theory, I examine some of the
most basic endogenous or network effects by looking at what is commonly called “k -
stars” in the network literature.26 k -stars refer to the “tendency for individuals to have
connections with multiple network partners” (Robins, Pattison and Woolcock (2008)).
The most basic form of k -star is the 2-star, which is the case where state x shares a
connection with two other states, y and z, but y and z are not connected to each other
(Frank and Strauss (1986)). In addition, a 3-star is formed when state x is connected to
states y, z, and q, but y, z, and q are unconnected. Notably, 2-stars form the fundamental
blocks of higher order stars (3, 4,5...k). As such, the use of 2-star is usually sufficient
in empirical testing. Moreover, it might also be a rare case that we find very high order
stars in the world trade network as this entails that all those countries connected to the
central state are unconnected to each other.27 As a visual description, figure 2 shows
the various star configurations for non-directed networks.
Substantively in the network literature, stars are often used to capture ‘popularity
effects’, also known as ‘preferential attachment’ (Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga
(2012), p.300). Maoz (2012) notes that “states prefer central trading partners because
those tend to either have competitive prices and/or produce commodities that are desir-
able by many other states” (p.346). Popular states such as the US, China and Germany
might also have large amount of economic resources relative to the rest of the world
that attract other states to form major trading relations with them. In addition, many
of these other states might not trade with each other due to long distances apart, or
other economic or political factors. For instance, Venezuela and South Korea are both
significant trading partners with the US (and vice versa)28 , but the two countries are
not significant trading partners with each other.29 Other similar instances might be
present in the world trade network. I thus develop my third hypothesis:
26 See Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga (2012). Their article presents an ERGM analysis on the
global alliance network.
27 Another (practical) consideration is that it takes a much longer time even for a supercomputing
cluster to calculate network models which have 3-stars and above for a large dataset (with nboot=500).
28 See US State Department website: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm and
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm
29 Derived from trade data compiled by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. For more information on the data,
see section V of this paper.
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Hypothesis 3: States in the international system are likely to establish strong trad-
ing ties with a popular state in the world trade network.
Extending from the argument on 2-stars, if one adds a connection between the two
actors that are previously unconnected, then we would have a ‘triangle’.30 Some states
in the international system might want to develop closed triangles of major trading
partners to leverage synergistic effects of trade, in which the utility derived from triadic
closure ties will be greater than the utility gained by the sum of the dyadic level ties.31
Substantively, one can think of this as a close cluster of major trading partners pooling
resources together, resulting in greater information sharing as well as greater trust and
commitments to trade. The collective gains of a closely tied triadic network of trading
partners might thus be more than the sum of the bilateral gains from trade.
Consequently, it might not be surprising to see two major trade partners of a third
state being major trade partners themselves to reap major joint gains in trade. For
instance, the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are all close or major trading
partners with each other. Other instances include close trading relations among Russia,
Finland and Lithuania. Importantly, from the examples, we see that both 2-stars and
triangles can exist in the world trade network. As research by Kali and Reyes (2007)
has further shown, there is a prevalence of triangles between 1992 and 1998 (p.602).32
I develop my fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Two major partners of a third state are likely to establish major
trading ties with each other, forming a closed triangle of major trading partners.
A New Methodological Approach
Traditional statistical approaches assume that the variables are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d), and hence cannot be used to model complex interdepen-
dencies. The trade data that I am using, however, encompass intricate interdependent
relations. Indeed, as discussed above, bilateral trade among countries in the globalized
30 A visualization of triangles can also be seen in figure 2.
31 See Cranmer, Desmarais and Kirkland (2012) for an explanation on synergistic effect of closed
triangles in alliance networks.
32 This overlaps with the time period used in this paper (1991-2000).
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world should be viewed as a large network of interconnected trading relations instead of
an aggregation of independent ties. Despite this, political scientists have traditionally
relied on common statistical methods such as the generalized linear model on network
data, since methods for the statistical inference on networks are not well advanced in
the field. As Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) note, common statistical methods of rela-
tional data in political science often assume that the “covariates in a dyadic regression
model are sufficient to account for the dependence among the observations” (p.66). How-
ever, this assumption will cause bias results as relationships among observations cannot
be modeled as a covariate, thus violating the assumption of conditional independence
among observations in common statistical regressions. Failure to model dependencies
when they exist will also falsely attribute explanatory power to covariates in traditional
statistical analysis.
Some social scientists have also tried to condition out interdependence “through the
use of innovative random effects” (p.66). However, complex random effects specifications
do not allow precise structural effects and interdependence that characterize the data
to be modeled. No doubt, some of the unmodeled structural effects may be of both
theoretical and empirical importance to social scientists. For example, popularity and
triangle-closure (e.g. the friend of my friend is likely to be my friend)33 go unmodeled
using regression analysis. As Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) further note, “even if the
researcher is only interested in evaluating a particular hypothesis about a covariate, bias
due to the omission of relevant structural effects can compromise the analysis” (p.67).
Consequently, the use of common regression on network data often leads to insufficient
models and bias results.
In order to model and account for structural effects and interdependence in my data
across time, I use an extension of the Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) called
the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM) in my analysis, originally
developed by Hanneke, Fu and Xing (2010) and further extended by Cranmer and Des-
marais (2011).34 As a statistical network approach, the TERGM allows me to estimate
33 The next few paragraphs will give a thorough explanation of the terms “popularity” and “triangle”.
34 An earlier version of this paper employs the latent space network model developed by Hoff, Raftery
and Handcock (2002). While dynamic latent space model has been discussed on paper (see Sakar and
Moore (2005) and Xu and Zheng (2009)), current publicly available software of the latent space model
does not allow modeling of networks across time (note that while Ward, Ahlquist and Rozenas (2013)
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structural characteristics for networks over time without the independence assumption
of common statistical approaches. Furthermore, the TERGM can model both exogenous
effects (covariates) and the structural effects that are endogenous to the network such as
popularity and the triangle. Consequently, “researchers can proceed with the ERGM [or
TERGM] analysis based on hypothesis similar to those that would produce regression
specifications (i.e. covariate x is expected to affect the outcome y), and as much network
structure (dependence) as they see fit” (Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), p. 67).
Overview of the Model and Some Basic Mechanics
Originally developed by Wasserman and Pattison (1996), the ERGM is a statistical
network approach that treats a network as a single multivariate observation rather than
a large number of relational observations. The modeling objective of the ERGM is
examining the probability of observing the network we did observe over the networks we
could have observed. Thus, if there are N possible networks with the same number of
nodes or actors N, then it must be N ∈ N and we want to know p(N ). Mathematically,





Here, θ is a parameter vector, Γ(N) is a vector of statistics computed on the net-
work, and the object of inference is the probability of the observed network among all
possible permutations of the network given the network statistics. The denominator,∑
N∗∈N exp{θ
′
Γ(N∗)} is the normalization constant, which is typically intractable to
compute. As noted by Cranmer and Desmarais (2012b), “the Γ(N) term is what gives
the ERGM much of its power: this vector can contain statistics to capture the interde-
pendence structure of connectivity in the network – statistics can be included to capture
reciprocity35 , transitivity, cyclicality, and a wide variety of other endogenous structures
uses the dynamic latent space model, their R code remains private). In other words, we are only able
to look at snapshots of the network and effects of the respective covariates without taking into account
dynamic or time effects. Consequently, results from the latent space model at a single point in time
are not very informative in this research. Furthermore, the latent space model does not allow for the
modeling of endogenous structural effects. Thus, I use the TERGM instead.
35 Note that reciprocity is for directed networks only. As I use an undirected network as my dependent
variable, the effect of reciprocity cannot be applied. See section V for more information on data and
variable construction.
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– as well as the effects of exogenous covariates” (p.1).36 The basic assumptions of the
ERGM given a set of network statistics are that (1) there is equal probability of ob-
serving any two networks with the same values of those statistics, and (2) the observed
network exhibits the average value of those statistics over the networks that could have
been observed. A brief outline of the ERGM algorithm is shown in figure 3.
Often, one is also interested in modeling the dynamics and evolution of a network
over multiple sequential observations. Consequently, the ERGM can also be extended
to accommodate inter-temporal dependence. This is accomplished by adding functions
involving past realizations of N to the set of Γ(.). Moreover, we also assume that the
network is observed in T discrete time periods. Time dependencies can thus be built
into the model by conditioning on previous realizations of the network. Thus, instead
of examining P(N |θ) as the probability of interest, we estimate a model with K -order
dependencies: P(N t|N t−K ,...N t−1), where N t is the network at some discrete period of
observation. In other words, the realization of N at time t is conditioned on the previous
K realizations. Moreover, as Hanneke, Fu and Xing (2010) note, “one way to simplify
a statistical model for evolving social networks is to make a Markov assumption on the
network from one time step to the next” (p.587). As such, we might assume that N t
is independent of N1...N t−2 given N t−1. Mathematically, under Markov assumption, a
sequence of observations N1...N t has the property that:
P(N2, N3...N t|N1) = P(N t|N t−1)P(N t−1|N t−2)...P(N2|N1)
Thus, if the time-dependent model is well-specified and given the Markov assumption,
the best predictor of a given network may be its last realization. In other words, N t
is dependent only on N t−1. Mathematically, the general formula for the first-order
TERGM model would be written as:




36 Limitations of the ERGM will be discussed later in this paper. Further technical details regarding
the estimation of the ERGM can be found in Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), and Hanneke, Fu and
Xing (2010).
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Data and Variable Construction
I use the trade dataset compiled by Kristian Skrede Gleditsch over the time pe-
riod 1965-2000.37 The IGO data38 used is compiled by Pevehouse, Nordstrom and
Warnke (2004) and is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) website. The classifi-
cation scheme of IGOs according to their functional and structural types were obtained
from Paul Ingram39 and then applied to the COW IGO dataset to generate subsets of
IGO data. Control measures such as distance, alliance, contiguity, democracy scores,
and ongoing conflict are all generated by EUGene40 for all dyads from 1965 to 2000.
Additional controls such as culture and geographical region are obtained from CEPII
(French Research Center in International Economics)41 and Fearon (2003) respectively.
The datasets are subsequently merged to obtain a master dataset containing all dyads
from 1965 to 2000 with a total sample size of 761286. A list of states in the sample for
the year 2000 is shown in figure 442 :
The Dependent Variable and Threshold Setting
Major partner trading relations between states in the international system are char-
acterized by a high level of bilateral trade.43 Focussing on major trading partners
as opposed to states that merely trade with one another will allow me to thin the in-
ternational trade network much more, otherwise the network will be almost completely
connected, which does not yield very meaningful analysis.44 Importantly, the emphasis
on strong and meaningful trading ties among states will also allow me to conduct a more
37 The Gleditsch trade dataset runs from 1950 to 2000 but IGO data only runs annually from 1965
onwards (before 1965, IGO data was collected at 5-year periods). As the TERGM is based on Markov
assumption and requires sequential time periods to run, I test my analysis from 1965 to 2000.
38 Version 2.3
39 Courtesy of Paul Ingram; also see Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005).
40 EUGene is an acronym for “Expected Utility Generation and data management program”; see
Bennett and Stam (2000).
41 See http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/welcome.asp
42 Note that the number of states fluctuate from year to year and I have only included the year in
which the number of states is at its highest count.
43 The threshold to determine major trading relations will be discussed later in this section.
44 Also see Chu-Shore (2010).
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conservative test on the effects of IGOs on bilateral trade.
In general, bilateral trade is the total trade (Tijt) between two countries i and j in a
particular year t. Mathematically, it is given by Tijt = Xijt + Xjit, where Xijt denotes
exports from country i to country j in year t. Modeling bilateral trade between major
trading partners as it is will result in a weighted network as dependent variable. How-
ever, this is problematic because the ERGM/TERGM has only been developed to model
binary ties, so we cannot apply ERGM analysis on weighted networks. Nonetheless, this
problem can still be overcome by thresholding, as seen in other social science literature
such as Faust and Skvoretz (2002), Fowler (2006), and Cranmer and Desmarais (2011).
Moreover, the use of thresholding is also quite common in modeling the world trade
network and a few prominent contributions have used a binary network analysis (Kim
and Shin (2002), Serrano and Boguna (2003), Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004), and Gar-
laschelli and Loffredo (2005))45 . Furthermore, as Serrano et al. (2010) note, although a
binary network is necessarily a condensed version of reality, this most basic representa-
tion of international trading relations have already provided significant and important
information about the world trade system. Indeed, a binary network analysis is the first
step to investigate how the topography and structure of the world trade network affects
trading relations among states in the international system.
In order to convert our weighted dependent variable to a binary one, we need to
first assign a threshold or cut-point. Thus, any bilateral trade volume that has a value
at or more than the threshold (which can be an absolute value or a percentage) will
be assigned ‘1’, and those values below the threshold will be assigned ‘0’. Importantly,
existing literature does not have a standard in choosing the threshold for bilateral trade
and different authors have their own ways of determining the threshold. For instance,
Kim and Shin (2002) test and use absolute value thresholds of 1 million and 10 million,
while Kali and Reyes (2010) construct their models using percentage thresholds of zero,
one, and two percent. Notably, a 0% threshold just indicates the mere existence of trade
among two countries and hence it is the least restrictive threshold. Nonetheless, other
papers such as Serrano and Boguna (2003), Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2005), and Kali
and Reyes (2007) just define a straightforward link using a 0% threshold.
45 Much of the literature on the world trade network are from econophysics, which is a new interdisci-
plinary branch of research that applies theories of physics to the realms of economics and finance.
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Since I am dealing with bilateral trade across years in a large dataset, I will use a
percentage threshold for greater flexibility. Following Kali and Reyes (2010) and upon
inspection of the data, a 1-2 percent of a state’s total trade for a given year is sufficient
to capture the state’s top 20-25 trading partners in the international system.46 For
greater robustness, I conduct preliminary tests using 1% and 2% thresholds and found
that the results were largely similar. In order to yield more conservative results and thin
the world trade network more, I select the 2% threshold.47 More formally, letting yijt
to represent my outcome variable, I have:48
yijt =
 1 if bilateral trade for year t, Tijt ≥ 2% of total trade for each state in dyad0 otherwise
Notably, this study uses an undirected network to analyze international trade. How-
ever, the world trade network can also be constructed as a directed one, which allow for
more precise endogenous effects such as reciprocity, transitive triples and cyclic triples
to be captured.49 Although directed networks might shed further light on the in-
herent dynamics of international trade and better reflect the reality of trade, the time
and computational power required to process the directed network statistics on massive
trade datasets might make this an inefficient endeavor. As such, I employ an undirected
network for this paper.
Independent Variables and Controls
The main covariates in my dataset are measures of IGO functional types (general
purpose, economic and social) as well as IGO structural types (structured and minimal).
In addition, note that measures of popularity and triangle are not represented by any
of the covariates in the dataset since they are endogenous to the network. Since I have
46 This is fairly consistent across years from 1965 to 2000.
47 This threshold will result in a much sparser network, with only 1.27% of the total number of
observations across all years assigned as having major trading partner ties.
48 This implies that both states are major trading partners with each other. By this method, I further
thin the network and adopt a highly conservative measure.
49 Reciprocity is a more precise measure of k -star(2), and transitive/cyclic triples more precisely rep-
resent triangles.
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already discussed at length the main covariates and the endogenous effects in the earlier
sections, I will give an overview of the control variables here instead:
Distance: Existing research has shown that the greater the distance, the higher the
costs of transporting the goods. Thus, greater distances decreases the gains of trade and
reduces trade itself. In general, countries that are geographically far apart are unlikely
to become major trading partners with each other. In my analysis, I follow Russett and
Oneal (2001), and Glick and Rose (2002) to estimate the log of the distance between
the capital cities of two countries.
Ongoing conflicts: Bilateral trade is likely to be weak or even nonexistent as a result
of conflict between two states. Having weak or reduced bilateral trade due to ongoing
conflicts is not only to signal hostility towards an adversary, but also to put pressure
on the other state to threaten its survival. Moreover, “private actors have their own
incentives to restrict trade with countries with whom relations are not reliably peaceful”
(Russett and Oneal (2001), p.220). Indeed, states that are in conflict pose heightened
investment risks and uncertainty for private actors or firms. Consequently, the existence
of ongoing military conflicts between two countries reduces the likelihood of major trad-
ing ties between them. This is captured by a dummy variable with ‘1’ indicating an
ongoing conflict in the dyad and ‘0’ otherwise.
Alliance: States are likely to maintain strong economic interdependence with those
with which they have good relations. Moreover, as Russett and Oneal (2001) posit, “a
state is apt to trade more with an ally because it need not fear that the economic gains
that arise from their commercial relations will be used to threaten its security” (p.136).
Furthermore, since wealth and technological gains from trade might also increase military
effectiveness of the trading partners involved and hence strengthen the resulting alliance
network as a whole, states might also aim to enhance the prosperity of their allies
via healthy trading relations. In this paper, alliance is defined similar to Leeds and
Anac (2005): “an alliance is a formal agreement among independent states to cooperate
militarily” (p.185). This variable is captured as a dummy with ‘1’ indicating an alliance
between two countries and ‘0’ otherwise.50
50 States in an alliance are also states that join common security IGOs. I use the Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data instead of the coding by Paul Ingram because it is more
widely used and reliable in the political science literature.
23
Direct contiguity: Similar to the explanation for distance, the more contiguous two
countries are, the greater the probability of them being major trading partners. Six
levels of specifications exist for direct contiguity. According to the EUGene codebook,
the first five levels follow the COW specifications for the types of contiguity: (1) land
contiguity or shared borders; (2) contiguous for up to 12 miles of water; (3) contiguous
for 13 to 24 miles of water; (4) contiguous for 25 to 150 miles of water; (5) contiguous
for 151 to 400 miles of water. Level 6 indicates that the states are not contiguous (or
are contiguous over more than 400 miles of water). Following the recommendations by
Russett and Oneal (2001), I transform direct contiguity into a dummy variable, with ‘1’
representing contiguity up to 150 miles of water (levels 1 to 4) and ‘0’ representing more
than 150 miles of water (levels 5 and 6).
Democratic dyad: Among many international relations scholars, democracies are of-
ten thought to be trade enhancing.51 Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998b)52 , and
Bliss and Russett (1998) were among the first scholars to analyze the effect of joint
democracy on trade and they found strong positive significant relationship between the
two. Furthermore, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000) also found that democratic
dyads have more open trade relations than mixed pairs. Following the literature, demo-
cratic dyads are more likely to result in major trading relations than non-democratic
pairs. As asserted by Russett and Oneal (2001), the argument is two-fold: (1) democratic
institutions provide accountability and transparency in political and economic affairs,
hence decreasing uncertainties and increasing business confidence, and (2) democratic
nations share the same norms of civil liberties and limited self-government, and thus
democratic countries have an affinity. I define democratic dyads as two countries scoring
a 6 or above each on the combined autocracy-democracy Polity IV scale (see Marshall,
Jaggers and Gurr (2011)). The resulting democratic dyad is a dummy variable, with ‘1’
indicating that the two countries are democratic, and ‘0’ indicating that both countries
are not democratic or a mixed dyad.
Culture: Countries with similar culture might be more inclined to form major trading
ties with each other due to greater affinity and trust. In this paper, two countries are
51 There is also the famous democratic peace theory stating that democracies rarely fight each other.
52 Also see Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998a)
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coded to have similar culture if they share the same first official language. Although this
measure is not perfect given that culture is a complex social phenomenon, it captures
at least the linguistic aspect of culture in countries. This variable is also used to control
for selection into socio-cultural IGOs. Dyads with similar culture are coded as ‘1’ and
‘0’ otherwise.
Geographical Region: States in the same region are near to each other for ease of
trade and are likely to be immersed in similar cultural roots. As such, countries in
the same geographical region have a high chance of becoming major trading partners
with each other. In addition, geographical region can also be an added proxy to culture.
Dyads in the same geographical region are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise.
Running the Models, Robustness Tests and Results
Four separate models are being run. In general, all four models consist of the control
variables and capture the relevant structural effects, but the main covariates are different:
(1) Model 1 comprises of the baseline model that aggregates all types of IGOs into one
general covariate53 ; (2) Model 2 comprises of the different IGO function types (general,
social and economic); (3) Model 3 is an added robustness check for model 2, in which I
further separate economic IGOs into PTAs, a GATT/WTO dummy, and other economic
IGOs that include regional banks and other economic institutions; (4) Model 4 comprises
of the two IGO structural types. I do not test all the main covariates in one single model
as that might lead to problems of multicollinearity.
Maximum Pseudo Likelihood (MPL) is used to produce consistent estimates of the
parameters.54 In addition, the computational tractability of the pseudo-likelihood
function makes it a very attractive alternative to the common full likelihood function.
As Cranmer and Desmarais (2011) note, “the computational burden associated with the
use of MCMC-MLE is insurmountable given current technology” (p.81). Besides using
the MPL method, I also implement a bootstrap resampling method for computing the
53 As discussed earlier, this model characterizes existing empirical tests on the determinants of bilateral
trade – many scholars agree that joint memberships in IGOs enhance bilateral trade, but they do little
to differentiate the effects of the different types of IGO membership on trade.
54 See Strauss and Ikeda (1990)
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95% confidence intervals.55 500 bootstrap iterations are used in each of my models and
the respective confidence intervals are calculated using the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles
of the sample of 500 bootstrap estimates. Results of the TERGM are reported in table
1.
From table 1, we see that results from the TERGM confirm our expectations re-
garding the world trade network structure. Firstly, the two-star coefficients measuring
“popularity” are all positive and significant at the 0.05 level across the three models,
indicating that besides the covariates, the structure of the world trade network matters
in motivating the collection of states to form major trading ties with popular or central
states. Secondly, the positive and significant effect of triangles across all three models at-
test to the hypothesis that tight clusters (or multiple triangles) of major trading partners
exist in the world trade web to leverage synergistic effects. Consequently, it is prevalent
that two major trading partners of a third state are themselves major partners. Indeed,
endogenous structural effects are significant both substantively and empirically in the
world trade network. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, both two-stars and triangles
can exist in the world trade network (although in this case the effect of triangles far
eclipse that of popularity effects, as reflected in the coefficient estimates). Not modeling
these structural effects in the statistical analysis will bias the results.
From Model 1, we see that IGO is both positive and significant at the 0.05 level.
However, the coefficient estimate of IGO is very small, which makes it important to
compare results from the other models. In addition, the control variables across all
four models also fit our expectations except for democratic dyad, which is negative and
statistically significant. This result might be due to the prevalence of mixed and non-
democratic dyads in the international system. Notably, democratic dyads, in which both
states have a score of 6 or higher on the Polity IV scale, constitute only 9.69% of total
dyads in the dataset.
Interestingly in Model 2, we see that only General Purpose IGO has a positive
coefficient estimate and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Economic and social
IGOs seem to have little effect on helping countries to establish major trading ties as
their coefficient estimates are very small (-0.026 and -0.023 respectively). The result for
55 See Efron (1981)
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economic IGOs is surprising as one would expect economic IGOs to be a strong driving
force for the establishment of major trading ties. As a robustness check, I further
split economic IGOs into more nuanced constituents: Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs), GATT/WTO, and other economic IGOs that include regional banks and other
economic institutions.56 Note that PTAs considered here are all multilateral in nature
(consistent with the COW IGO data v2.3 coding rules) and include common markets,
economic unions, free trade area as well as customs and monetary unions. Both PTA
and Other Economic IGO are count variables representing number of joint memberships,
while GATT/WTO is a binary variable.
Model 3 thus consists of the subcategories of economic IGOs with the same the
endogenous and control variables as the other models.57 From Model 3, we see that
General Purpose IGO is still positive and significant, while the effect of Social IGO
remains almost negligible, with a very small coefficient estimate. Of particular interest
is PTA and Other Economic IGO, which are both positive and significant at the 0.05
level. However, the coefficient estimate of Other Economic IGO is very small, which
reflects its weak role in establishing major partner trading relations. As such, PTAs
may be the only trade-enhancing force behind economic IGOs: states develop major
trading ties through preferential access and information sharing within PTAs. On the
other hand, WTO is negative and significant, which corresponds to the results in Rose
(2004). This begs the basic question of whether (and under what circumstances) the
WTO enhances trade between pairs of countries. One important explanation to note is
that even if the WTO helps to establish and enhance trade between members, it may
not be significant enough in helping members to become major trading partners. More
important factors are at play.58 The negative sign might also reflect the uneven (and
evolving) functions and memberships of the GATT/WTO across the years from 1965 to
2000. Other scholars such as Dutt, Mihov and Zandt (2012) has sought to address this
conundrum by delving deeper into the trade effects of the WTO, but that is beyond the
56 Empirically, the three new variables were created and split from my original set of economic IGOs
and the respective joint memberships were computed accordingly.
57 I have not included a detailed theorization of the different categories of economic IGOs in the theory
section as the primary aim of this paper is to conduct an overarching test for the effects of general
purpose, social, and economic IGOs building on Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005). As mentioned,
model 3 serves as a robustness test for the odd result found in model 2.
58 More will be explained later.
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scope of this paper. Overall, the results reflect the longstanding debate on the effects of
the WTO on bilateral trade.
In Model 4, the variable Structured IGO is negative but not statistically significant.
This means that the effect of Structured IGO is not distinguishable from zero at the 0.05
level. The result of Structured IGO is thus inconclusive. Furthermore, the coefficient
estimate of structured IGOs is also very small (-0.009). On the other hand, Minimal
IGO is positive and statistically significant, confirming part of our expectation. This is
somewhat puzzling as I expect the relationship of structured IGOs to be significant and
positive since structured IGOs provide elaborate and organized arbitration platforms
to smoothen diplomatic ties and lessen tensions, enhance understanding across multiple
dimensions, and create a more formalized in-group identity through its rules and pro-
cedures. All these factors are thus hypothesized to aid in establishing strong bilateral
trade among the members. One reason for the result could be due to unreliable data
of IGO structural type as pointed out by Ingram, Robinson and Busch (2005) in their
appendix (p. 855). Indeed, more accurate data collection and compilation are required.
Interestingly, the results hint at the importance of contiguity, ongoing conflict and
(regional) trading clusters. From all four models, we see that Direct Contiguity, Tri-
angle, and Ongoing Conflict have the greatest effects, which means that strong trading
ties mainly occur in countries that are contiguous and not at war with one another.
Moreover, countries in the same region might also form close trading clusters to further
reap joint gains from trade. Importantly, through closer inspection of the data, most
general purpose IGOs are regional in nature, which further reinforces the point that
it might be contiguity, the absence of war and trading communities that characterize
international trade.59 In other words, although international institutions might still be
important in bilateral trade relations, traditional factors such as contiguity and ongoing
conflict, as well as structural factors such as triangles, might be the primary drivers of
bilateral trade.
Notably, while the TERGM results provide association between particular types of
joint IGO membership and the establishment of major trading partner ties, the evidence
59 Note that while the control Geographical Region is significant and positive, it is not as large as the
other variables mentioned. This might be due to the loose coding of large geographical regions around
the world, failing to capture the more nuanced trading clusters and regions that are captured by the
other variables such as Direct Contiguity and Triangle.
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does not demonstrate the direction of causality. At the general level with reference to
results in model 1, does the problem of reverse causality exist? Do countries join IGOs
because they were already major trading partners with each other? Theoretically, the
assertion of reverse causality is hard to be established as aggregate IGO count is a
complex measure, which consists of general purpose, socio-cultural and economic IGO
memberships, that spans beyond the economic dimension. Similarly, from the results in
model 2, it is unlikely that countries join general purpose IGOs because they trade a lot
with each other. In other words, countries are unlikely to join an umbrella organization
such as the Nordic Council or the African Civil Service Observatory because of existing
trading ties.60 On the other hand, the problem of reverse causality might be more
significant in the case of economic IGOs. In this case, countries might join certain
economic IGOs because they already trade strongly with each other and they need to
find trustworthy, conducive and sustainable platforms for trade. However, countries that
are not major partners with each other previously might also be brought closer together
due to preferential access and information sharing of some economic IGOs such as PTAs
and hence establish strong bilateral trade with each other. Lastly, the problem of reverse
causality is not significant in model 3 as it is highly unlikely that countries join minimally
structured IGOs because they trade with each other. It might be that countries that
trade with each other would want to join structured IGOs that are better in mediating
and moderating tensions, but the variable Structured IGO is not statistically significant.
Thus, reverse causality should not be a major problem in this paper.
Conclusion
This paper presents a first step in examining the importance of various IGO types
in establishing major trading partner relations within the broader context of the world
trade network. While previous studies largely ignore or try to condition out network
effects in their statistical models, this paper incorporates these effects in testing how
certain types of IGOs matter in international trade. Importantly, while the TERGM
enables us to model network effects, it also has its pitfalls and flaws: since we are
60 I have omitted the discussion on social IGOs as the effect is almost negligible. Also, it is highly
unlikely that countries join social IGOs because they are major trading partners with one another.
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using maximum pseudo likelihood and not the maximum likelihood in our analysis, we
are unable to assess model fit adequately using commonly used information-theoretic
parametric measures such as the AIC or the BIC. Current goodness-of-fit (GOF) tests
of the ERGM are also not readily applied to the temporal extension. Nonetheless, some
papers such as Cranmer and Desmarais (2012a) have shown that TERGMs provide a
better fit than other dynamic network models such as SIENA, giving us more confidence
in the TERGM. This paper, however, does not provide a similar GOF testing due to the
very large dataset involved and the technical complications of testing TERGM models.61
From the results, network effects are significant in describing the world trade web.
Moreover, general purpose IGOs and PTAs also impact trade positively. While some
of my results remain inconclusive, more reliable data collection is necessary to advance
the research agenda in future. Moreover, I call for more efforts to make data on IGO
type publicly available and urge more replication of similar research. Importantly, since
research on IGOs have only recently focussed on its functional type and internal orga-
nization, greater theorization is also required in future research.
In addition, as this paper leverages on large-n analyses, the causal mechanisms de-
scribed in the theory might be too broad. More nuanced theorization of causal chains
analyzing how specific IGOs influence states’ decisions in trade policy62 or how IGOs
affect firms within states to engage in strong bilateral trade may provide deeper insights
to the questions raised in this paper. To add, since trade flows are primarily driven
by firms, which operate under the constraints of government policies, it might also be
helpful to see whether or not certain joint IGO memberships encourage firms of two
countries to trade with one another. Of course, the empirical analysis would require
much more nuanced data on firms and might not be easily captured using large-n stud-
ies. Thus, due to data and measurement limitations, case studies might better serve this
particular type of research. Case studies might also explore how joint IGO memberships
affect firms in particular sectors of the economy.
Future research can also investigate the strategic interaction between states and
particular IGO types. Is the role of the state more marked in economic and general
61 Future extensions might provide this, as well as other out-of-sample predictions of my TERGM
models.
62 To embark on tariff reforms for instance.
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purpose IGOs compared to social IGOs? What about minimal versus structured IGOs?
In other words, is the use of state power (especially for large and power states) more
prevalent in the decision making process of some IGOs relative to others? How might
that undermine the effects of IGOs? Indeed, it might be interesting to see the interactions
and strategic dynamics between particular IGO types and states.
The use of more specific IGO data can also be applied to studies of conflict. For
instance, to what extent and under what conditions does joint membership in socio-
cultural, economic or general purpose IGOs matter in reducing military conflict among
nations? Indeed, extending from traditional research that only uses the aggregate count
of joint IGO memberships, future research can separate joint IGO memberships into
various types and apply these data in the study of military conflicts. Consequently, the
use of more detailed IGO data may yield interesting theoretical and empirical advances




Table 1: TERGM Fit for the World Trade Network from 1965 to 2000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Popularity 0.086 0.068 0.074 0.077
[0.08, 0.09] [0.06, 0.08] [0.07, 0.08] [0.07, 0.09]
Triangle 1.243 1.257 1.191 1.238
[1.19, 1.30] [1.21, 1.31] [1.14, 1.25] [1.19, 1.29]
IGO 0.023
[0.02, 0.03]
General IGO 0.143 0.138
[0.12, 0.17] [0.12, 0.17]
Economic IGO -0.026
[-0.04, -0.02]
Social IGO -0.023 -0.072











Distance -0.141 -0.205 -0.183 -0.101
[-0.15, -0.13] [-0.23, -0.19] [-0.20, -0.17] [-0.12, -0.09]
Ongoing Conflict -1.440 -1.645 -1.540 -1.453
[-2.43, -0.75] [-2.67, -0.92] [-2.52, -0.76] [-2.3, -0.81]
Alliance 0.362 0.259 0.263 0.395
[0.26, 0.46] [0.13, 0.38] [0.09, 0.42] [0.28, 0.50]
Direct Contiguity 2.500 2.442 2.332 2.502
[2.32, 2.68] [2.26, 2.60] [2.15, 2.51] [2.30, 2.68]
Democratic Dyad -0.241 -0.329 -0.234 -0.258
[-0.42, -0.10] [-0.47, -0.20] [-0.41, -0.08] [-0.46, -0.11]
Culture 0.712 0.915 0.806 0.726
[0.61, 0.83] [0.81, 1.02] [0.70, 0.92] [0.59, 0.87]
Geographical Region 0.437 0.534 0.425 0.462
[0.27, 0.59] [0.38, 0.70] [0.27, 0.58] [0.30, 0.61]
Note: The above shows the TERGM estimates given in the columns with 95%
confidence intervals in the brackets. Confidence intervals not containing zero
are significant at the 0.05 level. N = 761286.
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Appendix B:
Fig. 1: IGOs Grouped by Function and by Internal Organization
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Appendix C:
Fig. 2: Different Types of Network Configuration
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Appendix D:




Fig. 4: List of States Included for the Year 2000
ccode statename ccode statename ccode statename ccodestatename ccode statename
2 United States of America 235 Portugal 438 Guinea 660 Lebanon 950 Fiji
20 Canada 255 Germany 439 Burkina Faso 663 Jordan 955 Tonga
31 Bahamas 290 Poland 450 Liberia 666 Israel 970 Nauru
40 Cuba 305 Austria 451 Sierra Leone 670 Saudi Arabia 983 Marshall Islands
41 Haiti 310 Hungary 452 Ghana 679 Yemen 986 Palau
42 Dominican Republic 316 Czech Republic 461 Togo 690 Kuwait 987 Federated States of Micronesia
51 Jamaica 317 Slovakia 471 Cameroon 692 Bahrain 990 Samoa
52 Trinidad and Tobago 325 Italy 475 Nigeria 694 Qatar
53 Barbados 331 San Marino 481 Gabon 696 United Arab Emirates
54 Dominica 338 Malta 482 Central African Republic 698 Oman
55 Grenada 339 Albania 483 Chad 700 Afghanistan
56 St. Lucia 343 Macedonia 484 Congo 701 Turkmenistan
57 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 344 Croatia 490 Democratic Republic of the Congo 702 Tajikistan
58 Antigua & Barbuda 345 Yugoslavia 500 Uganda 703 Kyrgyzstan
60 St. Kitts and Nevis 346 Bosnia and Herzegovina 501 Kenya 704 Uzbekistan
70 Mexico 349 Slovenia 510 Tanzania 705 Kazakhstan
80 Belize 350 Greece 516 Burundi 710 China
90 Guatemala 352 Cyprus 517 Rwanda 712 Mongolia
91 Honduras 355 Bulgaria 520 Somalia 713 Taiwan
92 El Salvador 359 Moldova 522 Djibouti 731 North Korea
93 Nicaragua 360 Romania 530 Ethiopia 732 South Korea
94 Costa Rica 365 Russia 531 Eritrea 740 Japan
95 Panama 366 Estonia 540 Angola 750 India
100 Colombia 367 Latvia 541 Mozambique 760 Bhutan
101 Venezuela 368 Lithuania 551 Zambia 770 Pakistan
110 Guyana 369 Ukraine 552 Zimbabwe 771 Bangladesh
115 Suriname 370 Belarus 553 Malawi 775 Myanmar
130 Ecuador 371 Armenia 560 South Africa 780 Sri Lanka
135 Peru 372 Georgia 565 Namibia 781 Maldives
140 Brazil 373 Azerbaijan 570 Lesotho 790 Nepal
145 Bolivia 375 Finland 571 Botswana 800 Thailand
150 Paraguay 380 Sweden 572 Swaziland 811 Cambodia
155 Chile 385 Norway 580 Madagascar 812 Laos
160 Argentina 390 Denmark 581 Comoros 816 Vietnam
165 Uruguay 395 Iceland 590 Mauritius 820 Malaysia
200 United Kingdom 402 Cape Verde 591 Seychelles 830 Singapore
205 Ireland 403 Sao Tome and Principe 600 Morocco 835 Brunei
210 Netherlands 404 Guinea-Bissau 615 Algeria 840 Philippines
211 Belgium 411 Equatorial Guinea 616 Tunisia 850 Indonesia
212 Luxembourg 420 Gambia 620 Libya 900 Australia
220 France 432 Mali 625 Sudan 910 Papua New Guinea
221 Monaco 433 Senegal 630 Iran 920 New Zealand
223 Liechtenstein 434 Benin 640 Turkey 935 Vanuatu
225 Switzerland 435 Mauritania 645 Iraq 940 Solomon Islands
230 Spain 436 Niger 651 Egypt 946 Kiribati
232 Andorra 437 Ivory Coast 652 Syria 947 Tuvalu
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